The Case for Corporate VC with TDK Ventures’ Nicolas Sauvage
An interview with Nicolas Sauvage, the founder and president of TDK Ventures.
Nicolas Sauvage is Founder & President of TDK Ventures, the corporate venture capital arm of TDK.

What path led you to start TDK Ventures?
I started as an engineer. I studied in France and England, interned at Siemens in Germany, and joined British Telecom, where I worked across different functions and became involved in international standards bodies. That gave me an early combination of technical work, negotiation, and learning how organizations with different interests could build something together.
It also shaped what I call an Equal Win. A win-win can still mean a small win for one partner and a very large win for the other. Over time, that imbalance can weaken the relationship. I want each partner to feel that what they gain justifies what they contribute. They may value very different things, but both should have a reason to keep investing in the partnership.
After British Telecom, I joined TTPCom before it went public and worked with mobile phone customers in China as that market was developing. I then joined OpenPlug, a startup with fewer than 20 team members, initially leading sales in Asia and eventually worldwide. At NXP Software, I took on global sales, product management, and P&L responsibilities.
Those experiences taught me that having excellent technology is only part of building a company. You also have to understand customers, earn their trust, and deliver what you promise.
I later joined InvenSense, moving from Taiwan, where I had spent 12 years, to California. TDK acquired InvenSense, and that introduced me to a company with a remarkable history of reinvention. Many people remember TDK for cassette tapes, but its history extends from electronic materials and components through consumer products and back into the technologies inside other companies’ products.
In 2018, I proposed creating a corporate venture capital firm with an exploration mission. We would work with entrepreneurs building emerging technologies to learn where TDK might want to go and where it should not go, the very definition of strategy in my book.
I had joined through the acquisition of InvenSense by TDK only a year earlier. I was based in California and did not speak Japanese. Yet TDK gave me both the opportunity to build the firm and the responsibility to lead it. That made its venture spirit very tangible to me.
Since launching in 2019, we have invested in 58 companies across four funds, with $500 million in assets under management. We have encouraging proof points, and I still consider us at the beginning. My ambition is to return at least twice the capital entrusted to us and help entrepreneurs build businesses that create billions of dollars of value. That is a standard we have to earn over time.
What’s TDK Ventures’ investment thesis, and where are you investing?
We invest in early-stage deep tech. Most of our initial investments are at inception, seed, or Series A, with Series B accounting for much of the remainder.
We look for several things together. The company should contribute meaningfully to society or the planet. It should address a market with the potential to reach at least $10 billion. And it should offer the possibility of a venture-scale outcome.
For us, that means an individual investment must have a credible path to returning the fund, even if the probability is small. If the best outcome we can imagine is a threefold return, it is really difficult to make the economics work across a portfolio of risky investments.
That requires looking beyond a large market number. What could this particular company earn within that market? What would it have to achieve, and what position would it need to hold, to produce that outcome?
There must also be strategic value. We begin by asking how much we can bring to the entrepreneur. Can TDK help address a technical challenge, support manufacturing, provide customer insight, or accelerate a commercial opportunity?
If we can make a meaningful contribution, we build a closer relationship with founders who are creating a future we want to understand. Through that work, TDK gains insights into emerging technologies, customer needs, and potential businesses. The founder’s progress and our learning reinforce each other.
Today, two funds are actively building their portfolios. Fund EX1 is our multi-LP fund focused on energy transformation in Europe and North America. Initial checks are typically $2 million to $3 million, with larger checks of up to $10 million available, particularly for follow-on investments.
Fund 3, our fourth fund, invests globally. We generally prefer initial checks between $1 million and $3 million, with checks of up to $5 million.
Where do you see opportunities geographically?
I am particularly bullish about Europe and India.
We established a team in London and have been building our Munich team. In Europe, the need to transform energy systems, strengthen industrial capabilities, and respond to geopolitical changes creates significant opportunities for entrepreneurs. Physical AI and robotics are part of that picture.
A necessary transition creates demand, but an investor still has to understand who can turn that demand into a viable business. Which customer has a sufficiently urgent problem? What would make that customer adopt a new technology? What can a startup do better or faster than an incumbent?
Local teams help us understand those questions earlier. They can build relationships with founders, customers, and industrial partners while an opportunity is still taking shape.
What makes you particularly bullish about India?
I see two powerful paths for deep tech founders in India.
One starts with a demanding domestic customer. In energy, mobility, or manufacturing, solving an Indian customer’s problem can require a combination of performance, affordability, and reliability that travels well. The question is whether succeeding in India builds an advantage the company can take into other markets.
The other starts with specialized expertise and a global problem. One of our portfolio companies, C2i, recently acquired by Infineon, is a good example. A team of Texas Instruments veterans based in India tackled power delivery for AI processors, a challenge with worldwide relevance.
That combination excites me. Founders can build from intimate knowledge of local needs or from technical expertise that puts them at the frontier globally.
For each company, I want to ask, “How does building in India increase your chance of becoming the global market leader?” The strongest answers connect the team, its first customers, and a technical advantage that becomes more valuable as the company grows.
What does it mean to invest “four years before it’s obvious”?
Four years is a way of thinking about timing.
Six years before an opportunity becomes obvious, we may need more capital and patience than our fund can provide. Two years before it becomes obvious, other investors may already see the opportunity, and much of its potential may already be priced in.
We want to invest early enough that our capital and TDK’s capabilities can make a meaningful difference, while seeing a credible path for the company to demonstrate progress and attract the next investors it needs.
That is the balance. You can identify a major technological transition correctly and still invest at a point when the company cannot survive long enough to benefit from it.
For an investor, a useful question is, “What do we understand today that others may recognize as this company makes progress?”
For a founder, the corresponding question is, “What can we prove with this round that will make the next stage of support possible?”
That proof might be technical performance, manufacturing repeatability, a customer willing to pay, or evidence that the economics work. The right milestone depends on the company. It should resolve an uncertainty that matters to whoever must commit next.
At TDK Ventures, this begins with our Deep Explorations. We study a space, build conviction from first principles, and challenge the assumptions behind it. If that conviction survives scrutiny, we can invest in an uncertain future with a clearer understanding of what must happen and where we can help.
Can you give examples of that thinking?
Groq is one. When we invested in 2020, I believed the inference market could become enormous.
Consumer devices have a natural limit in how many each person carries. There are only so many phones someone will carry. I saw no comparable ceiling on the number of useful inferences people and machines might request. Each new application could create more demand, including machines communicating with other machines.
That thesis existed before the ChatGPT moment and the current wave of agentic AI. Both accelerated the opportunity, but my conviction came from the underlying demand for inference.
We also believed Groq’s architecture was well suited to applications requiring predictable, low latency. That mattered because the investment thesis needed to connect a large potential market with a specific technical advantage.
The company still faced substantial risks. Believing that inference would become a major market did not answer every question about whether Groq could build the product, win customers, and finance its growth. Those were separate judgments we had to make. I explain the reasoning in Why We Invested in Groq.
C2i provides another example. As AI processors become more demanding, delivering power efficiently to the chip becomes increasingly important.
Type One Energy illustrates the same approach in a different field. Our investment reflected conviction in stellarator fusion and in the team’s approach to commercialization. The company recently announced a $200 million Series B.
The familiar observation that fusion is always ten years away is a starting point for investigation. We have to examine what has changed in the science, engineering, manufacturing, and business model, then judge whether those changes make a particular company investable. Our Type One Energy investment thesis explains that reasoning.
Across these examples, the work is to understand a constraint that could become more important as a market develops, then identify a team with a credible way to address it.
How do you build conviction at such an early stage?
It starts with the team. I look for curiosity, technical depth, and a willingness to do the work required to understand something difficult. I also look for team members who welcome having their assumptions challenged.
An investor has to hold two perspectives at once. You need to imagine how significant a company could become if everything goes well, while being rigorous about everything that could prevent it from getting there.
The upside gives you a reason to invest. Understanding the risks helps you decide whether to invest and how to support the founder afterward.
A useful way to examine a thesis is to ask what must be true across several dimensions. The technology must work well enough. A customer must care enough. The economics must support adoption. And the company must have enough capital and time to reach the next meaningful proof point.
Confidence in one dimension can obscure weakness in another. A strong technical result can still leave the customer’s purchasing decision unresolved. A large customer pipeline can still leave manufacturing economics uncertain.
Our investment team is deeply technical, with many PhDs. But technical expertise becomes more valuable when team members are willing to revise their views. That is part of what we mean by One Team Reaching for the Sky. We want the whole team contributing to a better decision.
Entrepreneurs First is another of our “CODE” core values. The purpose of doing this work well is to make better investment decisions and become more useful partners to the founders we back.
We have also published our Investment Scorecard, which founders can use to prepare for diligence and investors can adapt to their own work, and How our Investment Committee Works shares perspectives directly from the TDK corporate officers involved.
What does Precision Devil’s Advocacy add?
It gives us a disciplined way as a team to challenge conviction before we commit capital.
The central question is straightforward. What are the strongest reasons we should not proceed with a given investment?
The value comes from being specific. If the concern is customer adoption, which part of the customer’s decision is uncertain? If the concern is scaling, which manufacturing step could fail? If the concern is timing, what could take longer than the company can afford?
A challenge becomes useful when it identifies an assumption and helps us understand what evidence would change our view.
That also makes the work useful after we invest. We already have a clearer picture of where the founder may need help and which risks deserve attention.
For founders, the same discipline can improve a fundraising conversation. Explain the most consequential uncertainties, what you have learned so far, and how the next round will help resolve them. It gives investors a more concrete basis for judging both the opportunity and your understanding of it.
I describe the approach in Precision Devil’s Advocacy.
How should hard tech founders think about corporate VCs?
Start by recognizing how different they are.
If you looked at 50 startups working on industrial inspection robots, you would expect different technologies, strategies, teams, and capabilities. Corporate venture firms vary just as much. They have different mandates, investment processes, parent companies, and abilities to help.
The potential value also varies widely. A poorly aligned corporate investor can constrain a startup through restrictive terms, conflicting expectations, or behavior that complicates the next financing. A well-aligned corporate investor can bring technical expertise, manufacturing capabilities, customer access, and commercial channels that would otherwise take years to develop.
The question is which investor can help your company at its current stage.
I think of entrepreneurs as superheroes. They have some distinctive combination of insight, skill, or capability that gives them a chance to accomplish something that feels impossible. Investors should bring complementary superpowers.
A founder may already have exceptional technical talent but need help establishing a manufacturing process. Another may have a working product but need an early customer willing to test it in a demanding environment. Those companies need different partners.
Traditional VCs, corporate VCs, and angels can all play important roles. The founder’s task is to build a group whose capabilities fit the company’s needs and whose members can work effectively together. Like in a good superhero movie, they bring different superpowers and learn to use them together to win the day.
How can a founder tell whether a corporate investor will actually help?
I would ask, “What can this particular investor help us prove before our next round?”
Then make the answer concrete. If the promise is access to customers, which customers have a relevant problem? If it is technical support, what expertise or facilities could be available? If it is manufacturing help, what would that support allow the company to learn or accomplish?
There is a difference between having capabilities somewhere in a large organization and being able to bring them into a startup’s work. Founders should understand who would participate, why the collaboration matters to them, and what a realistic first step looks like.
References are valuable here. Ask portfolio founders what their investor actually contributed and how the team behaved when progress was more challenging than expected. Ask which contributions they valued most and why.
The terms deserve the same attention. Consider how any special rights could affect future customers, financing, or partnerships. If a corporation requests exclusivity, understand the commitment it is making in return, the scope of the restriction, and when it expires.
That is where Equal Win becomes practical. Each side should understand what it is contributing, what it hopes to gain, and how the collaboration can support the startup’s broader growth.
I explored these questions in Is Corporate Venture Capital Right for Your Startup? and Open the Market. Do Not Capture the Startup..
In deep tech, market leaders can capture a disproportionate share of profits. What should founders take from that?
A lesson I learned at TDK is to pay attention to where a company directs its attention.
A market leader looks forward and asks how to create more value for customers. A company trying to catch up can spend much of its time watching the leader and responding to its decisions.
That informs what we call our King of the Hill criterion. We are looking for entrepreneurs we believe could become market leaders five to seven years from now. Their position should allow them to create substantial value and give us insights into where the market is going.
For a founder, I would ask, “When you last changed your roadmap, what prompted it?”
Was it something you learned from a customer, a technical insight, or a change in what had become possible? Or was it mainly a response to a competitor’s announcement?
Competitors deserve attention. But if their choices consistently determine yours, it becomes harder to develop a distinctive view of what the market needs next.
Being first also requires more than defining a category narrowly enough to lead it today. The position has to matter to customers and become economically meaningful as the market grows.
If you want to build an iconic company, I would look for something the world needs that you are particularly well equipped to create. Then ask what would allow you to keep earning that position over time.
What patterns do you see in the most successful founders?
The challenges vary too much for a single formula. Sometimes the critical issue is thinking about manufacturing early enough. Sometimes it is securing an alpha customer. Sometimes it is proving that the technology works.
But one weak signal I have found interesting is the ability to write clearly.
Some founders are very compelling in conversation but struggle to communicate the same idea in writing. They need to be present to explain it, answer questions, and make the case.
That can work when a company is small. As it grows, the founder has to communicate through managers, partners, customers, and colleagues who will carry the idea into conversations the founder cannot attend.
Clear writing helps that happen. It allows others to understand the reasoning, make decisions, and explain the idea accurately themselves.
One practical test is to write a short explanation of a consequential decision and ask a colleague to explain it back. What do they understand about the goal, the reasoning, and what they are expected to do? The gaps can tell you where your communication still depends on your presence.
I treat writing as one signal among many. What interests me is whether a founder can make a complex idea clear enough for others to act on it. A practical example appears in The Cold Email VCs Want, where I share the concise outreach from EdgeCortix’s adviser that opened a conversation leading to our investment.
How do you define deep tech?
My starting point is the smallest elements of the physical and biological world. Atoms, electrons, photons, and cells.
I am drawn to companies whose core advantage comes from understanding and working with those building blocks. That could be a new semiconductor architecture, a material, or a photonic device.
The scientific or engineering advance is the foundation. Building a company around it requires translating that advance into something customers can use, trust, and afford.
That is the journey I find most interesting. A founder understands something difficult at a fundamental level, then brings together the technology, team, capital, and partners required to make it valuable in the world.